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BRIDGING THE MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE GAP: COORDINATION AND THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF UNIVERSITY SCIENCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine why commercialization of inter-disciplinary research, especially from distant 
scientific domains, is different from inventions from specialized or proximate domains. We argue that 
anticipated coordination costs arising from the need to transfer technology to the licensee firms and from 
the need for the inventor team to work together to further develop the technology significantly impact 
commercialization outcomes. We use a sample of 3,776 university invention disclosures to test whether 
the variation, in types of experience of the scientists within a team, influences the likelihood that an 
invention will be licensed. We proffer evidence to support our hypotheses that the anticipated 
coordination costs influence whether an invention is licensed, and that specific forms of team experience 
attenuate such coordination costs. The implications of these findings for theories of coordination, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship are discussed. 
 
 
 
3 
Organizations exist to achieve joint action, defined as individuals working together to achieve a 
desired outcome. Coordination is the problem of aligning actions so they are synchronized to achieve this 
objective. The ability to coordinate among interdependent actors stems from adequate mutual knowledge 
that enables individuals to act as if they can predict others’ actions (Camerer, 2003; March & Simon, 
1958; Puranam, Raveeendran & Knudsen, 2012). The traditional view is that coordination problems are 
strictly a consequence of misaligned incentives – and when appropriate incentives are provided, such 
problems should disappear (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994). This incentive-based approach contrasts with 
studies which find that coordination problems persist even when incentives are aligned (Camerer, 2003; 
Faems et al., 2008; Gulati, Lawrence & Puranam, 2005). Specifically, scholars from the Knowledge 
Based View (KBV) argue that a significant proportion of joint-production failures in organizations occur 
because of inability to synchronize joint efforts (Grant, 1996; Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Postrel, 
2009), either due to inadequate mutual knowledge or difficulty in creating such knowledge. In the context 
of commercializing discoveries, we examine how different kinds of inventor experience helps mitigate 
coordination problems under varying levels of mutual knowledge.  
The scientific discovery process has increasingly become a team production function, with a 
gradual shift in the locus of invention from solo inventors to teams and networks of inventors (Paruchuri, 
2010). Using a comprehensive sample of 19 million publications and two million patents spanning five 
decades, Wuchty et al (2009) find that teams generate far more innovations than solo inventors, large 
teams are commonplace and generate heavily cited (more impactful) research. From an examination of 
patent records, Singh and Fleming (2010) confirm that teams are more likely to produce breakthrough 
inventions when compared to solo inventors. Given a large scientific base, longer educational training in 
progressively narrower specializations is necessary to push the knowledge frontier (Jones, 2009). 
Consequently, the proliferation of team-based inventions is driven largely by two trends: first, the need 
for specialization to push the scientific frontier and second the need for interdisciplinary work to solve 
challenging scientific and practical problems. Whereas teams facilitate and focus collective knowledge to 
solve a problem, team activity is hindered by concomitant coordination costs when performing these 
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complex tasks (Guimera et al, 2005; Cummings & Kiesler, 2005). Though solving complex scientific 
problems can enhance social benefit (Basalla, 1988), the productivity of such efforts are necessarily 
diminished by their attendant coordination losses (Phelps, 2010; Weitzman, 1998). Therefore, how to 
gainfully combine different knowledge domains is a core problem in both the innovation and organization 
literatures (Vural, Dahlander & George, 2012; Zahra & George, 2002).   
Drawing from the knowledge based view, we approach technology commercialization as a joint 
production effort involving multiple specialists who are required to coordinate effort to perform complex 
tasks (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Though knowledge integration 
can be difficult and costly (Kapoor & Lim, 2007), it is essential for the commercialization of impactful 
technology (George et al., 2008; Kotha et al., 2011), a facet that is often neglected. Studies that draw on 
evolutionary theories argue that the inventions that build on the same knowledge domain have limited 
upside potential whereas those that build on different, complementary knowledge domains could 
potentially be valuable (Fleming, 2001, 2004; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Makri, Hitt & Lane, 2010). For 
example, combining knowledge domains such as molecular biology and photolithography can yield 
fundamental breakthroughs such as DNA arrays that transform genetic sequencing and mapping 
capabilities.  
Scholars from organization theory, social psychology and sociology have pointed out that it is 
extremely difficult for specialists from different knowledge domains to work together fruitfully. This is 
because specialists have different knowledge, beliefs, languages and norms of working, that it becomes 
difficult for them to understand each other and effectively complement each other’s knowledge 
(Dougherty, 1992; Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Latour, 1986). This suggests 
that the most desirable recombinations may also be difficult to fructify (Fleming, 2004; Phelps, 2010; 
Vural et al., 2012). The desirability-difficulty trade-off makes it challenging, ex ante, to understand how 
the likelihood of commercialization varies with the underlying science distance in an invention. We argue 
that anticipated coordination costs in the joint production task of technology commercialization helps 
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explain why commercialization of inter-disciplinary research, especially from distant domains, is different 
from inventions from specialized or proximate domains.  
Using insights from the KBV on coordination costs and from individual/group learning theories on 
the role of experience in reducing coordination costs, we add to the literatures on the production and 
commercialization of science as well as to broader discussions of coordination in teams. We contribute to 
the innovation literature by distinguishing between two sources of coordination costs in technology 
commercialization: they arise from the need to coordinate across inventor-licensee teams and from the 
need to coordinate within the inventor team for further refinement and modification of the invention to 
facilitate commercialization. Whereas prior work on coordination in teams, and in inter-firm technology 
relationships, have generally referred to the importance of prior joint work experience, we identify two 
specific types of experience, licensing experience and collaboration experience, in reducing the 
anticipated coordination costs
1
 in inventions characterized by differing levels of mutual knowledge.   
We test our predictions using event-history models that estimate the licensing hazard of 3,776 
unique inventions from a large US research university disclosed between 1981 and 2007. This study is 
among the first large sample, longitudinal, empirical tests of coordination among scientific teams and its 
implications for commercialization. We add a complementary perspective to prior work by highlighting 
the coordination-related aspects of combining distant knowledge domains in producing the type of 
inventions that are valuable (Fleming, 2001; Kapoor & Lim, 2007). Unlike prior work on technology 
commercialization that has largely ignored non-patented inventions (e.g., Shane, 2002; Vural et al., 2012), 
we study the commercialization of both patented and not-patented inventions. This comprehensive sample 
raises the quality of theoretical and practical discourse beyond inventions where intellectual property 
rights have been secured through patents; an important consideration that has broader implications for the 
commercialization of scientific knowledge and the practice of technology transfer.   
  
                                                          
1
 We use “coordination costs” as a convenient short-hand to denote both the costs of generating adequate predictive 
knowledge (Puranam, et al, 2011), and the cost of ‘wasted effort’ that arises from misaligned actions (Postrel, 2009).  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The theory development is structured as follows. First, we observe that the commercialization of 
inventions comprises two tasks: (1) effective knowledge transfer and coordination between the inventor 
team and subsequent (downstream) parts of the same or different organization; (2) effective knowledge 
transfer and coordination within the inventor team to further develop and modify the invention as required 
for successful commercial application. We hypothesize that these coordination costs and the value of the 
invention vary systematically with science distance and affect the likelihood of licensing. Next, we 
propose that learning from prior licensing experience helps attenuate coordination costs between inventor 
team and licensee firm (henceforth, firm-team coordination). Finally, we posit that learning from prior 
collaboration experience helps mitigate coordination costs between members of the inventor team 
(henceforth, within-team coordination).  
Commercialization of university research  
Scholars following an evolutionary economics tradition have argued that inventions are created 
by recombining existing knowledge (Schumpeter, 1934; Basalla, 1988; Fleming, 2001). Though inventors 
can combine any two pieces of knowledge, what actually gets combined is constrained by the localness of 
search and the social construction on what pieces can be gainfully combined (Basalla, 1988; George et al., 
2008; Kotha et al., 2011). Studies have argued that breakthrough inventions typically are the result of 
combining distant knowledge domains and are rarely produced by recombining proximate knowledge 
domains (Fleming, 2001, 2004; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Vural et al, 2012). Our focus, however, is not 
the discovery, but rather the commercialization of such inventions.  Inventions that recombine elements 
from the same technological domain are likely to be incremental, and therefore less valuable to a firm 
seeking commercial benefits compared to inventions that combine relatively more distant domains that 
offer the potential for breakthroughs. Therefore, from a commercial value perspective, inventions that 
combine proximate knowledge domains are less likely to be licensed than those that combine more distant 
knowledge domains.  
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Increasing science distance, however, creates a concomitant coordination problem. For a typical 
university invention, licensing is only the first stage in a long process of commercialization. Based on a 
survey of 62 American universities, Jensen and Thursby (2001) conclude that most university technology 
is embryonic and requires significant further work for successful commercialization. They report that 
about 75% of inventions were no more than proof of concept at the time of licensing; 48% did not have a 
prototype; and manufacturing feasibility was known for only 8% of inventions. The authors conclude that 
“…at the time of license, most university inventions are at such an early stage of development that no one 
knows if they will eventually result in a commercially successful innovation or not. Moreover, they are so 
embryonic that further development with the active involvement by the inventor is required for any chance 
of commercialization (p. 240; emphasis added).”  Many examples abound of the time and effort required 
to move inventions to commercial viability (Clarysse et al., 2005; George et al., 2002; Jain et al., 2009). 
As a professor at St. Mary’s Hospital, part of Imperial College London, Alexander Fleming discovered 
that a mold inhibited the growth of bacteria in 1928. Although the significance of this discovery was 
immediately felt, attempts to treat human subjects failed due to insufficient quantities of the drug being 
produced. Commercial production of penicillin was achieved only in the early 1940s when its chemical 
structure was decoded.  
The issue of further development effort required of university inventions continues to remain a 
challenge today and gives rise to firm-team and within-team coordination costs. The firm-team 
coordination cost arises from the need for adequate knowledge transfer and synchronization between the 
inventor team and the licensee firm to help the firm understand the value of the invention and jointly work 
towards commercialization. The within-team coordination cost arises from the need for the members of 
the inventor team to work together to integrate their knowledge in order to further develop the invention 
to create working prototypes and establish manufacturing scale. Below, we argue how jointly considering 
the likely value from a recombination and the two types of coordination costs involved in its 
commercialization help us understand the likelihood of licensing for university generated technologies.  
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Science distance and coordination costs in commercialization 
Several studies have argued that combining more distant knowledge domains is more risky than 
combining more proximate knowledge domains, but a few of these distant combinations result in 
fundamental breakthroughs of immense value (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Fleming, 2001; Fleming & 
Sorenson, 2001; Foster, 1986; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Utterback, 1994). Inventions that recombine distant 
knowledge domains can be valuable because recombining different disciplines can introduce pluralism in 
mental models and facilitate problem solving (Amabile, 1988). Increasing variety in problem solving also 
concomitantly increases the likelihood that solutions can be found for challenging problems (Fleming, 
2007; George et al., 2008; Singh & Fleming, 2010). However, many of these recombinations have little 
value because inventors have limited knowledge of the nature of interdependence between elements from 
two distant domains and ex ante have inaccurate expectations regarding their potential value. In contrast, 
inventors typically have some idea of the nature of interactions between two moderately distant domains, 
and can make informed choices regarding which experiments are more likely to succeed (Basalla, 1988). 
For example, as Fleming and Sorenson (2004) point out, inventors typically use science as a map to 
indicate regions of potentially valuable combinations in their search attempts. Since there is little 
interaction between distant sciences, scientific research is likely to provide a crude ‘map’. In contrast, the 
search space for recombinations involving proximate domains, though well understood, tends to be 
saturated, since a lot of experimentation has already occurred (Fleming, 2001; Ahuja & Katila, 2001; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003, Vural et al, 2012). Therefore, it is likely that 
any recombination involving proximate domains likely yields incremental improvements.   
Fleming and co-authors have examined how the value of an invention co-varies with the knowledge 
distance of the sciences on which they are founded.  Based on patent data analysis, Fleming (2004) argues 
that inventions which arise from proximate knowledge domains have limited upside potential.  In 
contrast, when distant domains are combined, the average value of such inventions is lower, but the 
variance increases, with a small number of inventions becoming extremely valuable. Fleming (2001) 
finds that patents belonging to a single patent class have significantly fewer forward citations. Fleming 
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and Sorenson (2001) similarly show that patent value is positively impacted by interdependence between 
the knowledge bases that underlie a patent, but value is negatively impacted by the square of 
interdependence, showing an inverted –U effect. They measure interdependence as the density of citations 
between two knowledge domains; the higher the cross-citations, the closer the knowledge domains and 
the more familiar specialists in one domain are with advances in the other domain. Kotha, et. al, (2011) 
also show that the knowledge distance of the firm calculated based on its patenting profile has a positive 
impact on both innovative output and innovation quality, while the square-term for distance has a 
negative impact on both innovative output and innovation quality. Taken together, the evidence suggests 
that if potential licensee firms were concerned only about the value of the invention, we would on average 
see an inverse-U shaped relationship between science distance and its hazard (likelihood) of licensing.  
Next, we argue that this potential relationship between science distance and licensing of an 
invention is reinforced when considering the coordination costs involved in commercializing academic 
inventions.  Since most university inventions lead the industry by several years (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007), 
the technology transfer organization and the inventor team need to educate a potential licensee firm 
regarding the prospective value of the invention. Apart from effort to convey invention value, the licensee 
needs to be reassured that the inventor team will fully engage with the commercialization process, are 
committed to generating further add-on inventions, and work with the firm’s employees to transfer 
adequate knowledge to make the required modifications for scale-up and manufacturing (Dechenaux, 
Thursby & Thursby, 2009; Jensen & Thursby, 2001).  Our premise is that if potential coordination costs 
are perceived to be high for an invention relative to its perceived value, firms are unlikely to license such 
inventions.  
When an invention combines proximate domains, the firm is more likely to possess the requisite 
absorptive capacity to evaluate its commercial potential (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). It is also more likely 
to have scientists and engineers who possess the requisite knowledge to work with inventors, to 
understand the nuances of the invention to further develop it for commercial applications. From a within-
team coordination cost perspective, the inventors from the same or proximate disciplines are likely to 
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have shared knowledge and common training that will allow them to easily work together. Though both 
types of coordination costs are lower when science distance is low relative to when science distance is 
high, they may not be trivial. There are multiple demands on academic scientists’ time (Mowery et al, 
2004), and given the considerable distance between typical industry and academic knowledge frontiers 
(Bayus & Agarwal, 2007), considerable effort may be needed in firm-team coordination. Yet, such 
proximate inventions may not have much value for firms because they may lie adjacent to existing 
technology portfolios or be perceived as marginal improvements, making the firm more selective 
(Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Consequently, jointly considering the potential value of the invention and 
the likely coordination costs in its commercialization, it is likely that low science distance inventions have 
a lower likelihood of licensing compared to distant inventions.  
In an invention that combines distant scientific knowledge, coordination costs are likely to be much 
higher (Siegel et al., 2003; Lockett et al., 2005; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). First, from a firm-team 
coordination cost perspective, it becomes more difficult to educate a potential licensee firm regarding the 
benefits of the invention, because the average licensee firm may not possess the requisite absorptive 
capacity in all the different knowledge domains. This is especially difficult since the knowledge 
underlying academic inventions, on average, lead the industry by several years. Whereas firms may 
recognize the potential of breakthrough inventions, they may not have the ability to evaluate its 
commercial potential in the medium term. This is a non-trivial problem, since even breakthrough 
technologies have valuable and less valuable patents. This difficulty is compounded by the effect of 
managerial coalitions and dominant paradigms of ‘what works’ in this industry, which are likely to hinder 
the adoption of these inventions (Kaplan, Murray & Henderson, 2003). Second, when distant domains are 
combined, the lack of absorptive capacity makes it more difficult to transfer the underlying tacit 
knowledge from these domains to the licensee scientists and engineers (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Given 
these high costs and large effort needed to develop an invention for commercialization, a firm may not 
choose to license it unless the value of the invention outweighs the cost of this effort.  
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In addition, since the average licensee firm typically does not possess adequate knowledge to 
further develop the invention to make it commercially viable, this burden usually falls on the inventor 
team (Dechenaux et al., 2009). When distant knowledge domains are combined, intra-team coordination 
costs are also likely to be higher because inventors from multiple domains are unlikely to have high levels 
of shared knowledge (Cronin & Weingart, 2007). First, scientists from distant domains are less likely to 
share a common language that allows them to effectively communicate their ideas between themselves. 
Second, different disciplines vary in their dominant logics regarding the nature of science and the most 
profitable avenues for further explorations in order to solve problems. For example, Knez and Camerer 
(1994) discuss how experiments are conducted for differing reasons using varied methods by 
psychologists and economists. Finally, disciplinary training and the scientific community in different 
disciplines also typically adopt different approaches regarding acceptable trade-offs in research methods. 
Since much of this knowledge is tacit and taken for granted, it becomes cumbersome for specialists from 
multiple knowledge domains to coordinate among themselves in further developing their inventions.  
Even though the innovating team has coordinated among themselves to create the focal invention, 
the low level of mutual knowledge among specialists remains a coordination challenge in the 
commercialization process. Team members need to carry forward their ideas from proof-of-concept stage 
to creating a prototype, then on to manufacturing scale (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). Typically, at this stage, 
interdependence between various elements that are combined becomes tighter as solutions have to be 
optimized for scale efficiencies. For example, there was a time lag of about a decade after the discovery 
of human embryonic stem cells for it to show commercial promise. A significant roadblock was the 
fragility of the cell lines themselves and the difficulty in propagating adequate quantities of the cells for 
commercial applications. The inventor team generated further inventions in the manufacturing processes 
to cultivate these cells to be more robust for commercial applications (Jain & George, 2007). The inventor 
teams needed to invest significantly to learn and solve these additional problems. Therefore within-team 
coordination is likely to remain a severe challenge for diverse teams even though they have worked 
together to already create the focal invention. For a firm, even though a distant recombination is valuable, 
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it may be reluctant to license because of high anticipated within-team coordination costs. In sum, the 
lower average value of inventions that combine distant domains when compared those that combine 
moderately distant domains and the high anticipated coordination costs, together lead to a reduced hazard 
of licensing for a high science distance invention.  
A recombination of moderately-distant knowledge domains is likely to be more valuable than those 
inventions that combine proximate or very distant sciences (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Kotha et al., 
2011; Vural et al, 2012). These moderately-distant inventions are also less likely to suffer from very high 
coordination costs because there are overlaps in the knowledge base, and scientists need to invest less 
effort to communicate the benefits of their inventions. Adequate absorptive capacity may also help the 
firm’s scientists to understand the improvement necessary for commercialization, and significantly reduce 
the knowledge transfer effort compared to distant inventions (Phelps, 2010; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). 
Firms are more likely to see moderately-distant recombinant inventions as extensions of their product 
lines and capabilities (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Dominant paradigms and managerial coalitions are 
therefore less likely to interfere with adoption of these new technologies. These effects on average reduce 
the firm-team coordination costs for inventions combining moderately distant sciences when compared 
inventions combining distant sciences.  
Within-team coordination costs are also correspondingly lower in moderately-distant inventions. 
When knowledge domains are only moderately-distant, different specialists in the innovating team are 
more likely to have some degree of shared knowledge. For instance, they are more likely to read each 
other’s journals and are conversant with scientific norms and paths of progress in the different fields; i.e., 
they share a common language that facilitates exchanging ideas and integrating knowledge. Therefore, 
potential licensee firms are likely to conclude that within-team coordination costs are manageable in 
moderately-distant inventions, and further development for commercialization is feasible. In sum, the 
higher average value of moderately distant combinations and the lower anticipated coordination costs 
relative to the invention value, together, on average, lead to an increased hazard of licensing for an 
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invention that combines moderately distant knowledge domains when compared to very proximate or 
very distant combinations. Based on these arguments, we posit that:  
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between inventor science distance and licensing likelihood 
is curvilinear, such that the slope is positive from low to moderate science distance and 
negative from moderate to high science distance. 
  
Prior licensing experience and firm-team coordination costs 
Because new technology can be difficult to describe and evaluate, it takes significant effort to 
convince a potential licensee regarding the value of the invention. Successful commercialization also 
requires significant further development, often to create prototypes, experimenting to ensure stability, 
robustness, and refinements to ensure manufacturability to sufficient scale; these modifications likely 
draw on the commercialization expertise of the licensee firm (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). From the 
perspective of the inventor team, we argue below that the firm-team coordination costs are lower for a 
team with prior experience in commercialization.  
Inventor teams with prior licensing experience are likely more aware of the firm–team coordination 
challenges and the need to invest significant time and resources in commercializing their inventions. 
Licensing experience likely provides the inventors with an understanding of the state of the art in the 
industry and the primary concerns that drive industrial R&D (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003). In other 
words, licensing experience provides higher levels of shared knowledge between the inventor team and 
the licensee firm, enabling them to more clearly explain the technology and tailor their knowledge 
transfer efforts to the needs of the licensee firm (George, 2005). Prior licensing experience is also likely 
to provide the inventor team with the knowledge and routines to better interact with their industry 
partners. An inventor team that has limited commercialization experience may not anticipate the effort 
involved in transferring knowledge and coordinating actions with the licensee, and may be unable to 
communicate the value of the invention persuasively to counter dominant logics. These teams are also 
unlikely to have routines in place to effectively transfer tacit knowledge to licensee firm scientists and 
engineers. These coordination challenges may lead the licensee firm to take a skeptical view of the team’s 
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capacity to assist with commercialization. This suggests that inventor teams with high licensing 
experience are likely to have greater odds of licensing than teams with limited experience.  
Hypothesis 2a: The greater the prior licensing experience of the inventor team, the 
greater the licensing likelihood for an invention, ceteris paribus.  
 
Next, we argue that the prior licensing experience of the inventor team moderates the relationship 
between science distance and the hazard of licensing by differentially changing the anticipated firm-team 
coordination costs across inventions at low, medium and high science distance. At medium science 
distance, the firm-team coordination costs are neither low nor high as in the corresponding low and high 
science distance inventions. As discussed earlier, the greater the team’s prior licensing experience, the 
lower the likely firm-team coordination costs.  
However, inventions that recombine moderately distant knowledge domains are on average more 
valuable (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Fleming, 2004). Furthermore, firms may perceive these moderate 
distance inventions as logical extensions to their current work and therefore perceive these inventions to 
be more valuable. In order to realize this perceived value, licensee firms may be more willing to 
undertake the additional firm-team coordination costs when working with an inventor team with low prior 
licensing experience. Therefore, from a firm-team coordination cost perspective, we argue that teams with 
high licensing experience are unlikely to have a significant advantage over teams with average licensing 
experience; similarly, teams with low licensing experience are unlikely to have a significant disadvantage 
when compared to teams with average prior licensing experience. In other words, for medium science 
distance inventions, higher licensing experience is unlikely to be associated with significantly higher odds 
of licensing.  
High science distance inventions are characterized by a significant need for knowledge transfer and 
coordination in multiple knowledge domains between the inventor team and licensee firm. This is likely 
to be difficult because the internal organization architecture of firms reflects prevalent combinations and 
links between fields rather than novel and infrequent combinations (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Inventor 
teams with high levels of prior licensing experience are likely to have lower firm-team coordination costs. 
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These teams can rely on routines and processes developed from previous interactions in order to more 
effectively convey their knowledge to industry participants. Their prior experience interacting with the 
industry is also likely to enable them to better understand and act upon the concerns of the licensee firm 
in improving the invention for commercial use. Therefore, at high science distance, increase in prior 
licensing experience from average to high is likely to be associated with a significant increase in the 
hazard of licensing.  
On the other hand, a team with low levels of licensing experience is likely to lack the tools, routines 
and processes that enable the invention team to relate to and address the concerns of the licensee firm and 
therefore is likely to face significant firm-team coordination costs. The typical licensee firm understands 
the crucial role played by the inventor team in transferring knowledge and developing the invention, and 
therefore, may look for a positive track record among the inventors for licensing (Mowery & Rosenberg, 
1998). Therefore, the licensing likelihood for an invention at high science distance is likely to 
significantly decrease as licensing experience decreases from mean to low.  
Firm-team coordination costs for low science distance inventions, though lower than at medium and 
high science distance, is still likely to be challenging because academic inventions typically lead 
industrial research by a significant margin. Since low science distance inventions, on average, are 
incremental improvements that have lower value than moderate science distance inventions, licensee 
firms are likely to license only those inventions that they believe can be commercialized with very little 
additional cost. Since teams with high prior licensing experience have low firm-team coordination costs, 
their low science distance inventions are likely to have a higher hazard of licensing when compared to 
teams with average experience. Similarly, since teams with low prior licensing experience on average 
have high firm-team coordination costs, their low science distance inventions are likely to have lower 
hazard of licensing when compared to teams with average experience. Putting the above arguments 
together, we predict that:  
Hypothesis 2b: Prior licensing experience moderates the curvilinear relationship between 
inventor science distance and licensing likelihood, such that the inverted U-shaped 
pattern is amplified when experience is low and neutralized when experience is high. 
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Prior collaboration experience and within-team coordination costs 
Within-team coordination costs arise from the need for members of the inventor team to jointly 
work to further develop their inventions for successful commercialization. Commercialization 
requirements impose significant coordination needs on the inventors in order to configure the sub-systems 
to create prototypes and achieve efficient scale (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). These concerns may differ 
from typical early stage invention concerns such as demonstrating proof-of-concept. For example, in 
drugs research and development, early concerns of efficacy of the active ingredient are supplanted later 
on with concerns regarding finding formulations that help the body absorb the medicine with few side-
effects (Henderson & Cockburn, 1996). Therefore, even teams that have worked together in developing 
the focal invention need to invest in significant learning in order to solve these commercialization 
problems; this gives rise to within-team coordination costs (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005).   
Coordination problems that arise when specialists from different disciplines work together have 
been studied by scholars in diverse streams, including in organization theory, social psychology and 
sociology. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argued that organizations need to straddle the differentiation-
integration trade-off and proposed that mechanisms such as cross-functional training and experience 
working in multi-functional teams can help resolve the most difficult coordination problems. In our 
context, studies of coordination problems that arise in the contexts of multiple specialists working 
together in scientific labs have shown that these teams incur significant coordination problems that are 
mitigated by working together and developing degrees of shared knowledge across the specialists (Knorr-
Cetina, 1999; Teurtscher, Garud & Nordberg, 2009).  
Social psychologists have also extensively studied this issue, comparing the information gains from 
diversity, especially functional diversity, and the concomitant process losses that arise from the difficulty 
they have in working together (Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). In our setting, within-team 
coordination requires that the scientists relate to each other’s needs and requirements, understand the 
trade-offs they have to make and the consequences of such trade-offs. The inventors need to develop 
shared knowledge regarding the challenges in further development, decide on future directions for 
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development and agree on a division of labor based on who is best equipped to solve specific challenges. 
They may need to understand specific tools and methods proposed by members, and dovetail their own 
effort to match those of their colleagues, all of which increase within-team coordination costs (Cronin & 
Weingart, 2007; Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000).  
Prior collaboration experience alleviates within-team coordination costs by enabling participants to 
generate shared mental models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mohammed & Dumville, 2001). Prior 
experience increases both aspects of shared mental models – i.e., it provides both a shared representation 
of the task, called task mental models, as well as shared understanding of the distribution of expertise in 
the team, called team mental models or transactive memory systems (Mathieu et al, 2000; Liang et al, 
1996). Recent work has suggested that coordination utility of transactive memory systems is not limited 
to the task on which it was obtained, but is transferrable to distinct but related tasks (Lewis, Lange & 
Gillis, 2005; Lewis et al, 2007). Collaboration experience also allows the team to develop a shared 
language and routines that facilitate coordinating future work. Finally, teams with prior collaboration 
experience also share tacit knowledge on tools and techniques, and their uses and constraints, which 
enable inventors with prior collaboration experience to substantially reduce intra-team coordination costs.  
Our theoretical concern is the reduction in coordination costs that accompanies an increase in 
mutual knowledge among interdependent individuals. Our specific argument is that when more members 
of the inventor team have worked together before, the greater the development of shared mental models, 
shared language, and shared routines in achieving coordination. The density of prior collaborative ties 
among the inventor team captures our core theoretical construct. This is in contrast to most prior work on 
the effects of prior experience generally measure the intensity of prior collaboration. The intensity of 
collaboration measures the number of prior interactions, but this need not be an accurate indicator of 
increase in mutual knowledge in the team. For example, in a five member team, if two members have 
worked together ten times before, and none of the others have worked together, these two members are 
the only ones who likely have common ground. In contrast, if all the five team members have worked 
together before, but only twice for each dyad, we still have a prior experience count of 10; however, the 
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latter team is likely to have much greater common ground that enables them to reduce coordination costs 
more effectively. In other words, we expect that the density of prior collaborations among the inventor 
team leads to increase in common ground and a corresponding decrease in coordination costs, even after 
controlling for the intensity of prior experience. Based on the arguments above, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 3a: The greater the prior collaboration experience within the inventor team, 
the greater the licensing likelihood for an invention.  
 
Next, we posit that collaboration experience moderates the relationship between science distance 
and licensing by differentially changing the anticipated within-team coordination costs across inventions 
at low, medium and high science distance. Parallel to our arguments for licensing experience, first take 
the case of a moderate science distance invention where prior collaboration experience increases from 
average to high. At moderate science distance, within-team coordination costs are significant, but 
manageable. Inventors are likely to share some common ground regarding the underlying knowledge 
domains and they may be able to build on this pre-existing knowledge to productively work on modifying 
the invention for commercialization. This is especially likely to be true if the inventors have some level of 
prior collaboration experience. Teams with low prior collaboration experience undoubtedly face higher 
within-team coordination costs than teams with high experience. However, inventions that recombine 
moderately distant knowledge domains are on average more valuable (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001) and, as 
argued above, are also likely to be perceived to be more valuable. Given this high value estimation, firms 
may be willing to incur the additional coordination costs associated with commercializing an invention 
from a team with low experience. Since the knowledge domains are marginally distant, licensee firms 
may also believe that these additional costs may be low. Therefore, from a coordination costs perspective, 
we argue that teams at moderate science distance, with high collaboration experience are unlikely to have 
a large advantage over teams with average experience, and also, teams with low collaboration experience 
are unlikely to have a significant disadvantage.  
At high science distance, within-team coordination costs are likely to be extremely high (Siegel et 
al, 2003; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Makri et al, 2010). Unlike the moderate science distance case, there is 
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likely to be very little common ground between scientists from very different disciplines (Cronin & 
Weingart, 2007; Dougherty, 1992). It is likely to be quite difficult for inventors to understand the nuances 
of sciences with very little overlap and build on them substantially in order to create new knowledge 
(Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Huber and Lewis, 2010). As argued above, teams with high level of 
collaboration experience are likely to have developed requisite common ground across all the experts, 
reducing anticipated within–team coordination costs. Therefore, at high science distance, increasing 
collaboration experience from average to high is likely to have significant positive impact on the hazard 
of licensing. Conversely, decreasing collaboration experience from average to low is likely to exacerbate 
within-team coordination costs. Therefore at high science distance, decreasing collaboration experience 
from average to low is likely to be associated with a lower hazard of licensing.  
In low science distance, teams with high collaboration experience, for similar coordination cost 
reasons are likely to be very efficient in working together in further developing the invention. Because 
low science distance inventions, on average, have lower value than moderate science distance inventions, 
licensee firms are likely to license only those inventions that they believe can be commercialized with 
little additional cost. Therefore, for low science distance inventions, teams with high collaboration 
experience are likely to have a higher hazard of licensing when compared to teams with average levels of 
experience.   
Similarly, at low science distance, even though inventors are fairly familiar with each other’s 
knowledge domains, they still need to invest considerable time and effort in further developing the 
invention for successful commercialization (Jensen & Thursby, 2001). Inventors with no prior experience 
are unlikely to have developed shared routines and have limited knowledge of each other’s skills, 
expertise and idiosyncratic preferences, likely resulting in increased costs of further collaboration. Given 
that inventions at low science distance, on average, have lower value than inventions at moderate science 
distance (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001), and since academic inventors have competing demands on their 
time (Mowery et al., 2004), a licensee firm may believe that the inventor team may not invest requisite 
effort in collaboration in further developing the invention for commercialization. Therefore, reducing 
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collaboration experience from average to low is likely to lead to reduce licensing hazard for low science 
distance inventions. Given the above arguments, we predict that:  
Hypothesis 3b: Prior collaboration experience moderates the curvilinear relationship 
between inventor science distance and licensing likelihood, such that the inverted U-
shaped pattern is amplified when collaboration experience is low and neutralized when 
collaboration experience is high.  
 
METHODS 
The research site for testing our hypotheses is the Technology Transfer Office (TTO) of a large 
U.S. University. Established in 1925, this TTO receives over $50 million in licensing and other annual 
income. The members in our research team have visited the TTO frequently and conducted extensive 
interviews with managers from the four major functional areas – intellectual property, licensing, legal, 
and general administration.  Almost all university employees disclose their inventions to the TTO. The 
intellectual property right managers (IPMs) liaise with the inventors and educate them on the need for, 
and the process of disclosure. This TTO prides itself in its outreach efforts to achieve comprehensive 
disclosures, even of risky inventions. When a disclosure is made, the TTO records the names of all the 
inventors and the principal investigator is typically assigned the role of the first inventor. The IPMs then 
interview the inventors and write a report that evaluates the commercial potential of the invention. The 
decision to pursue patent protection and commercialization are taken on the basis of this disclosure report 
at monthly review meetings. The TTO records all disclosures and decisions including whether to patent, 
how widely to patent, and whether to seek licensing without patent protection. By documenting archived 
paper records and computerized databases, we constructed this dataset and gathered additional data as 
described next.  
Sample 
The data for this study were collected in 2006 and 2007, and includes disclosures made to the 
TTO between 1981 and 2006. We started at 1981 to reflect a dramatic change in institutional environment 
with passing of the Bayh-Dole Act. This Act enabled university faculty to benefit from the intellectual 
property (IP) created by government-sponsored research and obliged universities with ensuring that such 
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output is transferred as goods and services back into the economy. Although we record all disclosures 
from 1981 onward, we include all relevant information regarding the inventors and the TTO such as 
experience since 1960. From 1981 to 2006, there were 3,776 unique inventions were disclosed to the TTO 
by inventors in teams of two or more. Of the 3,776 disclosures, 755 (or 20%) were licensed; of these 431 
inventions were licensed once, the rest were licensed multiple times. Of these 3,776 disclosures, 874 were 
patented, 339 (or 38%) of which were licensed. Of the remaining 2,902 disclosures that were not 
patented, 416 (or 14%) were licensed.  
Estimation Strategy and Dependent Variable 
To estimate the impact of inventor characteristics on technology licensing, we used an event-
history methodology. For all disclosures, we collected disclosure date and licensing dates. About 80% of 
all disclosures were not licensed at the end of the study period. Since survival models control for right 
censoring, they are the most appropriate model to use in this study. They also control for multiple failure 
events, which is important for our estimation, since in our data 43% of licensed disclosures were licensed 
multiple times. Our dependent variable is the licensing odds for a given invention.  
The estimation strategy was based on the steps recommended by Cleves et al. (2010) and 
Kleinbaum and Klein (2012). First we focused on the underlying theoretical rationale i.e. the drivers of 
the distributional form of licensing hazard. An invention disclosed to the TTO is unlikely to be licensed 
instantly, hence with time the hazard of licensing may increase. In our data, the average licensing time is 
about 7.8 years and the modal licensing time is 4 years. However, after a point of time, inventions that 
have not been licensed have a lower hazard of licensing. We checked to see if the underlying distribution 
of licensing hazard was indeed initially increasing and then decreasing, and we found this to be the case. 
This distributional form meant we have to use parametric estimations that fit non-monotonic hazard 
functions. We used log-logistic model to estimate the survival odds that best fit this hazard function. We 
conducted tests to see if the log-logistic form was appropriate and found this to be the case. Survival odds 
are the inverse of licensing odds that we use to state our hypothesis, and are similar in theory and 
interpretation to (the inverse of) the hazard of licensing (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2012). That is coefficients 
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that are negative and significant imply that an increase in the independent variable leads to an increased 
hazard of licensing. We tested to see whether our results were sensitive to the specific parametric 
assumption and found that our results are robust to multiple distributional specifications and also to non-
parametric estimations.  
Explanatory Variables 
Science distance. Our theory suggests that the more distant the knowledge domains that are 
combined, the more difficult it is to license. We capture the breadth of knowledge domains that are 
combined by considering how many different specialists contributed to the invention. We assign 
specialization to the inventor team based on the schools and departments in which these scientists are 
employed
2
. A simple construction of science distance is to code the invention as “proximate” if the 
scientists are employed in the same department/school, and as “distant” if they are employed in different 
schools. This simplicity may overstate science distance; for example, it masks the fact that scientists in 
biology and medicine may share a large overlap in mutual knowledge when compared to scientists in 
physics and biology. Therefore, we replace the coarse category classification with a fine-grained measure 
of distance between sciences based on the prevalence of cross-disciplinary research between any given 
pair of sciences.  
Sociology of science has long focused on studying the relationship between sciences. One tool 
that is often used for this purpose is citation analysis. The more field ‘A’ draws from field ‘B’, the lower 
the knowledge distance between field ‘A’ and field ‘B’. In order to map the knowledge distances between 
sciences, we follow Leydesdorff and Rafols (2009). In order to understand cross-disciplinary citation 
patterns, they first classify 6,164 journals to 172 subject categories used by Institute of Science 
                                                          
2
 Recent work to capture the knowledge distance between scientists has focused on the patent sub-categories in 
which their discoveries are classified (Tzabbar, 2009; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001), the intuition being that if two 
scientists file in the same category, their knowledge bases overlap. The distance between the categories is measured 
using the citation proportion between all patents in one sub-category with the other patent sub-category. We do not 
use the patent-based measure but rely on the intuition behind these measures. The reasons we do not use the patent-
based measure are: i) About 77% of the inventions in our data are not patent protected; ii) recent evidence (Alcácer 
& Gittelman, 2004) suggests that assignment of a patent to sub-classes is done by patent appraisers and the inventors 
may not see their work as being in a particular category. 
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Information (ISI)
3
. The reason why the analysis is not done at journal-to-journal level is because the 
matrix is sparse, i.e., out of the nearly 38 million possible dyads (6164*6164), only 3% have values 
greater than zero. The authors use the 172 subject categories listed by ISI in the year 2006
4
 as the starting 
unit of analysis. Journals are assigned to a subject category by ISI staff based on a list of factors that 
include the coverage of the journal and its main audience. The average number of journals per category is 
56.3 and the range by category varies from a low of five journals to a high of 262 journals. Even with the 
reduced set of 172 subject categories the revised matrix of citation patterns between the 172*172 
categories results in nearly 30,000 cells, most of which are zero. The authors collapse the 172 subject 
categories into 14 broad categories based on cluster analysis. The authors recommend that analysis of the 
citation pattern between the 172 subject categories identified by ISI and the 14 broad categories yields the 
best results to measure knowledge distance between sciences.  
The values in the cells in this 172*14 matrix range from 0 (which indicates no citations between 
journals in category i to the journals in category j) to a high of .91 (which indicates that 90% of the 
citations in category i are to journals in category j). We calculate science distance as (1-value in the cell), 
so that high values indicate high science distance; i.e., there is little citation between the two fields.  
In order to use this scientific distance matrix, we classify all inventors in our database to the 172 
scientific specializations, using the department and school in which the inventor works. We used two 
graduate students with engineering or science undergraduate degrees to do the classification. In the few 
cases where the coders disagreed, we consulted experts to resolve the difference. We measured scientific 
distance at the level of the inventor team. We aggregated the dyadic distance of every pair of inventors 
and averaged it across all dyads to get a team-level measure of science distance. Science distance is 
                                                          
3
 Interdisciplinary journals complicate the story as they are hard to assign to a unique science category. One of two 
approaches is followed by scholars: either to ignore interdisciplinary journals altogether and concentrate on the top 
few journals in each science or include the interdisciplinary journals in only one science category.  
4
 We use a static measure of science distance instead of a truly time varying measure from 1981-2006. ISI publishes 
data classifying journals into subject categories only since 1997; therefore it is empirically difficult to obtain this 
data before 2006. However, Rafols, Porter and Leydesdorff (2010) suggest that at higher levels of aggregation 
similar to ours, the science distance measures are very robust. Also, since we use data from the end of our sample 
period in 2006, we are more likely to under-state than over-state science distance. This is more likely to downward 
bias our coefficients and work against us finding any results in support of our hypotheses.  
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bounded by zero and one, with zero indicating that all the inventors are in domains that have high overlap 
of knowledge and one indicating that there is little overlap between the inventors’ knowledge domains. In 
our sample, the average science distance for a team is 0.3 with a standard deviation of 0.4  
Prior licensing experience. Prior licensing experience for a team is measured as the total number 
of prior licenses held by the members of a team from 1960 until the time of licensing or censoring, as 
appropriate, divided by team size. The variable has a mean of 14.5 licenses and standard deviation of 
27.9. An alternative measure of prior licensing experience, the cumulative count of the licensing 
experience of all inventors in a team without standardizing, also yields the same results in our estimations.  
Prior collaboration experience. Inventors with large stocks of common ground are more able to 
coordinate with each other in further improving the invention. We use prior joint work experience as a 
proxy for pre-existing stocks of common ground that may be leveraged in this coordination situation. For 
good intra-team coordination, it is best if all the members of the team share adequate shared knowledge in 
the form of a common language, rules and routines and common understanding of decision premises. For 
this purpose, we are interested in the completeness of shared experience (Latour, 1986) rather than the 
simple count of prior shared experience as we argued in the hypotheses development section. We measure 
prior collaboration experience as proportion of dyads in an inventor team with prior collaboration 
experience. Specifically, we calculate the count of dyads who have worked together prior to licensing 
date or censoring date as appropriate and divide it by the total possible number of dyads in the inventor 
team. This variable ranges from zero to one, where zero implies none of the inventors have worked 
together before, and one implies that all the inventors have worked together before.. It’s mean is 0.6 and 
std. dev is 0.4.  
Control Variables 
We construct a host of control variables derived from the patents that underlie the inventions as 
used in prior literature (Shane, 2002; Elfenbien, 2007). We also include a number of non patent measures 
for all the inventions, including whether the focal invention is patented. For inventions that are not 
patented we set the control variables derived from patents to be zero. We also use an alternative approach 
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to derive the mean value for these variables based on observed values of all other variables used in the 
estimation. The results for the theory variables are similar across both these approaches.  
Quality of the invention. In order to understand why some disclosures are licensed, we need to 
control for the quality of the invention. Ziedonis (2007) suggests that the number of citations received by 
a patent is a good indicator of economic potential. We count the total citations a patent has received, 
excluding self citations up to 2007.  
Stage of development of the invention. Most university disclosures are early stage in the 
technology commercialization cycle with no commercial prototype or field data (Thursby & Thursby, 
2002). Ziedonis (2007) uses the number of other patents that the focal patent cites as a measure of 
whether the patent is radical or builds on existing technologies and is further along the commercialization 
cycle. Similarly, we count the number of backward citations of the focal patent as a measure of its stage 
in development.  
Academic prestige: Elfenbein (2007) reports that inventors’ academic prestige is positively linked 
to licensing outcomes. To control for the quality of the inventors, we collected data on the academic 
publications of the members of the inventor team.  
Government Funded IP. We use an indicator variable to determine whether the IP is funded by a 
government agency. Government sponsored scientific projects may likely push the frontiers of science, 
which may have a material effect on licensing hazard.  
Private funded IP: We use an indicator variable to determine whether the IP is funded by a 
private organization. Funded projects are likely to be of greater commercial interest to the sponsoring firm 
and, hence, are likely to get licensed sooner.  
IP Not Protected. Given that our sample includes non-patented intellectual property such as 
biological materials, tools, and software that can also be licensed, we used a binary variable (1 = not 
patented) to control for the absence of patent protection at the time of licensing.  
Collaboration intensity: In our theory development we have argued that completeness of prior 
joint work experience among the team members is important for achieving coordinated outcomes. We 
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also control for prior collaboration intensity among the team members. Collaboration intensity is 
measured as the average of the count of the number of prior collaborations between each dyad in the team 
until the time of licensing or censoring as appropriate.  
TTO capabilities: The TTO may be more or less experienced in licensing different technologies 
and this may impact the likelihood of licensing of a given invention. We control for this by counting the 
number of prior inventions the TTO handled in the technological domain of the focal invention.  
Year Effects and Time since sample start date: We include a year indicator variable to control for 
unobserved year fixed effects. In addition we add a control for the number of days since Jan 01, 1981 and 
the disclosure date. This variable captures any time trends that may lead to changes in the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, this variable accounts for the possibility that disclosures in recent periods may be 
treated differently from the disclosures in prior periods. Omitting the time since start of sample variable 
did not change the results for the theory variables. 
RESULTS 
We report descriptive statistics and the correlations between variables in Table 1. All correlations 
above .02 are significant at p<0.05 level. In Table 2, we report the results of survival models with robust 
standard errors, clustered for multiple disclosures by the same inventor team. The dependent variable is 
the survival odds of an invention i.e. the odds that an invention survives in the observation period without 
a licensing event. Consequently, positive values of the coefficient imply a negative relationship between 
the variable and licensing hazard. In model 1, we report the baseline model with only the control 
variables. In model 2, we included the main effects of theory variables: science distance, science distance 
squared, prior licensing experience and prior collaboration experience. In model 3, we add the 
moderations between science distance and the experience variables. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 Here 
---------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a curvilinear relationship between science distance and survival odds; such 
that moderate distant inventions should have the least survival odds. In line with this prediction, in model 
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2 the main effect for science distance is negative and significant (β =-1.54; p<.05) and the squared term is 
positive and significant (β=1.86; p<.01). To test if moderate distance inventions have the least survival 
odds, we plot the estimated licensing odds across the observed range of science distance in our sample 
(see Figure 1). Note that the model predicts survival odds; we calculated the licensing odds as (1- 
predicted survival odds). As hypothesized, we find that moderate distance inventions have the highest 
licensing odds. The highest licensing odds reaches is 0.30 when science distance is 0.42. Whereas when 
science distance is mean minus one standard deviation the licensing odds are 0.23 and science distance is 
mean plus one standard deviation the licensing odds are 0.26. Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the licensing odds will be higher as licensing experience increases. In 
model 2, there is a negative and significant relationship between licensing experience and survival odds 
(β=-.009; p<.01), supporting our prediction in hypothesis 2a.  
Hypothesis 3a predicts a positive relationship between prior collaboration experience and 
licensing odds for an invention.  The coefficient for prior collaboration experience (β=-0.0149) is not 
significant in model 2. Hypothesis 3a is not supported.  
We test the moderation effects using the results from model 3 in Table 1. Hypothesis 2b predicts 
a positive moderation by licensing experience on the relationship between science distance and licensing 
odds such that the curvilinear relationship is neutralized as prior licensing experience increases. The 
interaction term between science distance and licensing experience is negative and significant (β=-0.081; 
p<.01) and the interaction term between science distance squared and licensing experience is positive and 
significant (β=0.095; p<.01). To facilitate interpretation, in Figure 2, we plot the licensing odds at 
different levels of science distance and different levels of licensing experience. We plot these figures at 
the median time it takes to license an invention in our sample (approximately eight years)
5
.   
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 - 3 Here 
---------------------------------- 
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 We checked for robustness using different years: 3, 5 10, and 12 years as well as at the mean (7.8 years) and mode 
(4 years). Our results are similar.  
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When prior experience is low i.e. one standard deviation below the mean prior licensing 
experience, the hazard of licensing an invention is 0.24, 0.40 and 0.23 at low, moderate and high science 
distance respectively. When prior experience is at mean, the hazard of licensing an invention is 0.27, 0.50, 
and 0.28 at low, moderate and high science distance respectively. When prior experience is high, i.e., one 
standard deviation above the mean value, the hazard of licensing and invention is 0.29, 0.69, and 0.29 at 
low, moderate and high science distance respectively (Figure 2). This suggests that curvilinear shape is 
more pronounced as experience increases, contrary to hypothesis 2b. Though not presented here, if we 
plot the entire data range, we find that at extreme values of prior licensing experience, in line with our 
hypothesis, that the relationship between science distance and hazard of licensing is essentially flat except 
at the ends of very low and very high science distance. However, within the two standard deviation range, 
hypothesis 2b is not supported.   
Hypothesis 3b predicts that the curvilinear relationship between science distance and licensing 
hazard is more pronounced at low values of prior collaboration and is neutralized at high values of prior 
collaboration. We test the moderation effects using the results from model 3 in Table 1. The interaction 
term between science distance and collaboration experience is positive and significant (β=4.329; p<.01) 
and the interaction term between science distance squared and licensing experience is negative and 
significant (β=-4.497; p<.01). To interpret the moderation hypotheses we use Figure 3 which shows the 
relationship between science distance and licensing hazard at various levels of prior collaboration 
experience. When prior collaboration experience is at mean value the hazard of licensing an invention is 
0.29, 0.33, and 0.24 at low, moderate and high science distance respectively. When prior collaboration 
experience is low at mean value minus one standard deviation, the value of hazard of licensing and 
invention is 0.25, 0.34, and 0.20 at low, moderate and mean science distance respectively. This suggests 
that the curvilinear relationship of science distance and licensing hazard is more curvilinear (inverted – U) 
at low than at moderate distance as hypothesized in hypotheses 3b. When prior collaboration is high, at 
mean plus one standard deviation, the hazard of licensing an invention is 0.32 0.30, and 0.28 at low 
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moderate and high science distance indicating that the curvilinear relationship is now flatter, supporting 
hypotheses 3b.  
Robustness Checks 
We conducted several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results to alternative 
specifications, different measures and the influence of outliers. First, our sample combines disclosures 
that are patented and those that are not patented. We checked to see if our theory holds across these sub-
samples. We report the estimations by patented (model 3) and not patented (model 2) sub samples in 
Table 3. The results for the theory variables are broadly similar across these two sub-samples. The main 
difference is that the moderation terms for prior licensing experience are not significant in the patented 
sub-sample. One explanation for this result is that the patenting process potentially codifies a large part of 
the tacit knowledge that underlies an invention, which may reduce firm-team coordination costs.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 Here 
---------------------------------- 
We ran several other estimations that are not reported in the manuscript. We tested whether our 
results are sensitive to our assumption of the parametric form in the survival models. Our results are 
qualitatively unchanged for several different parametric assumptions as well as in non-parametric 
estimations. We tested the robustness of our results to multiple licensing events of the same disclosure. 
We ran survival models with only a single failure event (licensing or censoring) per disclosure and 
compared it to survival models with multiple failure events (multiple licenses for the same disclosure), 
clustered by disclosure and inventor team. Our results are qualitatively identical across these estimations. 
Some licensee firms may have licensed more than one invention from the TTO, and have routines in place 
that reduce the coordination cost in licensing. Since we cannot explicitly use a control variable of 
licensing history between the licensee firm and the TTO, as this is not defined for inventions not licensed, 
we rerun our estimations clustering for the repeated licensing by some firms and we get similar results.  
In addition to control for demand conditions we include variables from the Yale Survey on 
industrial research and development on the relationship between sciences and industry that may influence 
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certain type of science to be commercialized faster (Klevorick et al., 1995). These variables are not 
significant in the hazard of licensing and hence are not included in our estimations. Furthermore, we ran 
estimations dropping outliers and our results remain unchanged. We also tried to check if unobserved 
factors regarding team formation impact licensing. We followed a two-stage method to predict the 
likelihood that a given team would form and then used the hazard ratio from this prediction as an 
additional control in predicting licensing (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003). Our results remain robust.   
DISCUSSION 
We examined the coordination problems that stem from the lack of mutual knowledge when 
innovative teams attempt joint action. By focusing on the coordination of experts from distant versus 
proximate scientific domains, we are able to highlight the different coordination challenges in the 
commercializing inventions, specifically the challenges in taking university research to industry 
applications. Our findings suggest that mutual knowledge among inventors and routines to transfer 
knowledge to licensee firms are important to overcome coordination challenges. We find that prior 
collaborative and prior licensing experience respectively help mitigate these two types of coordination 
costs. The implications for theories of coordination in organizational design and the production and 
commercialization of discoveries are discussed next.  
Theories of Organizational Design and Coordination  
Recent approaches to organization design drawing on the KBV have emphasized the role of 
achieving coordination in joint production tasks and have emphasized the role of organizations as vehicles 
for generating adequate mutual knowledge or common ground that enables interdependent agents to 
coordinate their activities (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996; Puranam et al, 2012). These 
approaches articulate a view of organizations as coordination systems, as opposed to the traditional view 
of organizations as incentive systems (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994; Williamson, 1991). We explicitly 
adopted a coordination lens to study the joint production problem, specifically by focusing on the 
variation in the level of mutual knowledge within an inventor team, holding other factors constant. We 
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found support for our arguments that anticipated coordination costs help explain licensing patterns of 
university technology.  
The main effect of prior collaboration experience on licensing was not significant; instead prior 
collaborative experience becomes pertinent only as a moderator of science distance. We find that low 
experience teams perform much worse at high science distance due to the lack of mutual knowledge, and 
its attendant coordination costs. Joint work experience is likely to reduce coordination costs under all 
conditions; however our finding suggests that in the invention commercialization process such 
efficiencies gain importance only under some conditions. Specifically, within-team coordination costs 
become important only when the cost of coordination is expected to be large relative to the value of 
expected value of the invention. Further, theoretically, we differentiate between firm-team coordination 
costs versus within-team coordination costs and argue that these costs are mitigated respectively by 
different kinds of experience, i.e., licensing experience and collaboration experience respectively will 
mitigate these costs. Though we do not empirically distinguish between these two kinds of coordination 
costs, our moderation results strongly suggest that these different costs do drive the invention 
commercialization process.  
It is intuitive that prior joint working experience is helpful in collaboration efforts by specialists 
from multiple domains. Specifically, we contribute to the literature on the impact of prior experience on 
coordination in specialist teams in two ways. First prior literature on joint work has typically used 
dichotomous measures for knowledge distance as within-domain or across-domains. By measuring 
knowledge distance as a continuous variable, we contribute to understanding how prior experience likely 
impacts coordination costs depending on variation in the level of mutual knowledge available in the team. 
It is interesting to note that though levels of mutual knowledge likely vary monotonically with knowledge 
distance, prior experience that bridges this mutual knowledge gap has a non-monotonic impact on the 
likelihood of commercialization. Second, studies typically measure prior collaboration experience by 
intensity of joint work, such as the amount of time partners teams have worked together (e.g., Latour, 
1986, Vural et al., 2012). However, intensity in addition to mutual knowledge creation can capture other 
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effects such as socialization. This prevents us from pinpointing whether the effects we observe are indeed 
a function of generating mutual knowledge. For instance, in our data, though collaboration intensity has a 
positive main effect on licensing odds, the interaction terms with science distance are not significant. This 
would be in line with our theory if collaboration intensity were actually capturing socialization effects 
rather than mutual knowledge effects. In contrast, we argue that the density or the closure of prior 
experience, i.e., the proportion of team members that have worked together before, is also an important 
consideration in reducing coordination costs. This is a more accurate measure of the existence of mutual 
knowledge, especially in large innovative teams, which are becoming more common place. We show that 
the density of prior experience has an impact on coordination costs (and likelihood of forming technology 
commercialization relationships) even after controlling for the intensity of prior experience.  
Our findings reinforce the crucial role played by mutual knowledge and coordination costs in 
organizational design and joint action. Future extensions of this study could take a more dynamic 
approach do the distances between science fields and consider how incentives and coordination costs 
jointly and independently influence outcomes of team action. Nevertheless, this is among the first, large 
scale, longitudinal settings for a test of coordination when mutual knowledge is low in a joint team 
production of inventions.  
The Commercialization of Scientific Discoveries 
Our study proffers evidence for the coordination costs perspective in technology 
commercialization. In so doing, this study speaks to the heart of commercialization of scientific 
discoveries, and the core challenges in integrating knowledge from disparate technical niches. The trend 
towards team production of scientific discoveries (Paruchuri, 2010; Wuchty et al., 2009), and the shift 
towards interdisciplinary science that recombines distant, rather than insular domains push forward the 
frontiers of human knowledge (Basalla, 1988; George et al., 2008). In that context, the empirical finding, 
of licensing likelihood at moderate science distance, presents an interesting pattern. From the figures 2 
and 3, we see that at moderate science distance, high collaboration experience teams do not perform better 
than moderate experience teams. Though average experience seems to be beneficial when compared to 
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low experience, the magnitude of the impact of experience seems to be lower than at the low or high ends 
of science distance. It is likely that moderate distant inventions occupy a “sweet spot” in the 
commercialization process -- they tend to be more valuable than inventions resulting from adjacent or 
very distant combinations, and potential licensee firms are likely to recognize their value and partner with 
the academic inventors in its commercialization. Therefore, potential licensees may be more willing to 
license such inventions and partner with teams that have some (rather than low) experience. Future 
research should explore these processes further. However, it is interesting to note that prior licensing 
experience is valued highly by potential licensee firms even at moderate science distance, and the TTO 
has higher success licensing inventions by teams with high prior licensing experience.  
A complementary explanation to our coordination costs logic is that inventor teams with high 
licensing experience are working in more applied areas that are more readily commercialized, and teams 
with prior collaboration experience may be working on more incremental improvements to their prior 
work that could also have commercial applications. We attempted to control for these effects. First, we 
controlled for the academic publication record of inventors; presumably, more academic publications 
point to more basic research. Second, in the patented sub-sample, we controlled for the relative weight of 
academic citations to other (patent) citations. Arguably, the more academic work cited by a patent, the 
more basic it is, and the more applied work cited by the patent, the more incremental the invention. Our 
results for our coordination-cost variables were unchanged in these robustness tests. Future work should 
more carefully delineate the impact of these different mechanisms.  
The findings also add to the substantial repository of empirical work on the value of patents. The 
citations that a patent receives have been used as a proxy for quality of the patent. In our study, the results 
suggest that the likelihood of licensing increases by 2% with every additional patent citation. The 
innovation literature has predominantly relied on patents as an indicator to explain both the process of 
creating knowledge and the performance of firms, which has drawn some criticism as scholars have 
questioned the value of a patent given the explosion of patenting activity by firms (Jaffe & Lerner, 2004). 
Furthermore, others have questioned the link between empirical measures and the reality of the patenting 
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process wherein some critical variables like citations to prior art are frequently added by patent examiners 
suggesting that either inventors may have not used the prior art cited or may have been unaware of it (e.g., 
Alcacer & Gittelman, 2004). There is a paucity of empirical work that examines commercialization 
beyond patenting.  
In this study, we include all inventions disclosed at a university that could potentially be licensed. 
Of the 3,776 disclosures, only 23% were patented. Of the 2,902 disclosures that were not patented, 416 
were licensed. The number of licenses from non-patented inventions is 1.23 times greater than the number 
of licenses from patented inventions. This suggests that it is important to go beyond patenting to 
understand discovery and commercialization processes. For example, Shane (2002) finds that nearly 60% 
of inventions at MIT are patented, out of which 52% were licensed. In that study and most others in this 
literature, inventions that could be licensed but were not patented are ignored. By including all inventions 
whether patented or not, we provide the first, large sample, investigation of licensing of non-patented 
inventions.   
Our research also has implications for more traditional licensing of technology between firms and 
more broadly for inter-organizational technology transfer or development. In the past decade, an 
increasing number of studies on technology sourcing relationships, including buyer-supplier relationships 
(Becker & Zirpoli, 2011; Srikanth & Puranam, 2011), technology alliances and joint ventures (Gulati & 
Singh, 1998;; Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009) and acquisition integration/acquisition performance (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Makri et al, 2010) have begun to emphasize the role of 
knowledge integration, in the success of inter-organizational relationships. We extend this coordination 
costs logic to the formation of technology licensing relationships characterized by the need for close joint 
work between the licensee and licensor.  
Our setting is particularly interesting because we observe the formation of technology licensing 
relationships where the traditional make-or-buy considerations do not apply. The university does not 
commercialize its own inventions. Therefore, any inventions that are not licensed essentially have zero 
net present value, which provides an opportunity to observe the role of coordination costs in the formation 
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of a licensing relationship. We draw from theories of experience, especially theories of learning by doing 
at the individual and group levels of analysis, to inform our understanding of the influence of 
coordination problems on the formation of inter-organizational licensing relationships. Considering the 
role of coordination costs in technology commercialization relationships is an interesting extension to 
prior research on role of coordination costs in make-or-buy decisions (Hoetker, 2005; Monteverde, 1995).  
The literature on open-innovation suggests that firms should take advantage of innovations 
produced by specialists outside their boundaries (Chesborough et. al., 2006). A significant and growing 
portion of these licenses are from universities and scientific research laboratories (Mowery & Rosenberg, 
1998), where the respective partners have complementary capabilities: basic research and 
commercialization of innovations. Our study suggests that the licensing of inter-disciplinary inventions 
could involve significant coordination costs that may not occur in licensing specialized inventions. Since 
managing these coordination costs are likely to hold the key to commercial success, firms should keep in 
mind such costs when making decisions regarding the external procurement versus internal development 
of innovations.  
Incentives and Coordination 
 In this study, we focused on the anticipated coordination cost as an explanation of why some 
inventions are licensed and not others. Presumably incentives offered to license intra and inter 
disciplinary inventions could be heterogeneous. Whereas there is a wealth of theoretical work on contract 
structure between licensee and licensor, there is paucity of empirical work on the topic. Future work could 
consider the variations in incentive contracts with differences in types of inventions, and how these 
contracts change with the experience of licensee and licensor capabilities. Such research efforts would 
throw light on the role of incentive structure on successful commercialization of a licensed invention as a 
product or service. 
  Future research could also be enriched by examining the role of a central “coordinating agent” in 
a team. It is plausible that in lieu of dyadic ties between inventors working across distant scientific 
domains that one central coordinating agent who has worked with all inventors in the team can interpret 
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results of the work of all members in the team may be just as effective. Because this coordinating team 
member will expend more effort in orchestrating the actions of others, whether the central coordinator 
should be rewarded with a higher share of the income is an important question. More fundamentally, does 
the bearer of the coordination cost also commensurately benefit from its success? The limited empirical 
evidence on incentive sharing is seen in the literature on entrepreneurs distributing equity to their helpers. 
A substantial majority of founders of nascent ventures tend to share incentives equally with their helpers 
(Ruef, 2009), whereas some entrepreneurs with specific human capital are able to deviate away from the 
equal distribution of incentives (Kotha & George, 2012). Consequently, the effects of specific and general 
human capital of the inventors on incentive distribution and its implications for team performance become 
interesting and economically meaningful questions for future research.  
Opportunity Recognition in Entrepreneurship 
 The central debate in the literature on entrepreneurship is regarding the nature of opportunities 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2010; Dimov, 2011). Some scholars have taken the view that opportunities for 
bringing new products and services to market are objective, and entrepreneurs identify these opportunities 
based on their prior experience (Shane, 2012). Other scholars view entrepreneurs as constructing 
opportunities, where it is not possible to specify an opportunity ex ante unless it has been enacted 
(Venkatraman, et al. 2012). Our study considers inventions as potential opportunities that could be 
commercialized, and that they vary in value based on the science distance and the anticipated 
coordination costs. We find support for the likelihood that moderately distant inventions have a higher 
probability of being successfully licensed. These results are consistent with the treatment of opportunities 
as objective, and that inventor experience improves the odds of success, consistent with opportunity-
individual nexus view of entrepreneurship (Shane, 2012). By starting with all inventions that could 
potentially be licensed, we avoid the fallacy of defining opportunities based on its success outcome. On 
the issue of whether opportunities objective or subjective, we proffer evidence to support the view that the 
value of opportunities, on average, could be objectively assessed by the scientific distance between the 
inventors in a team. Individual factors further improve the likelihood of licensing in distant domains 
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consistent with the notion of opportunities being objective, consistent with the literature’s treatment of 
individual experience effects in entrepreneurship.  
Role of the TTO and Managerial Implications 
We argued that the variation in the level of mutual knowledge of inventors in a team influences 
the perceived value of a technology and its anticipated coordination cost, thereby influencing which 
inventions gets licensed. The central actors in our setting are inventors, the TTO, and licensing firms. The 
TTO is tasked with protecting and licensing the inventions. It is the TTO that communicates with 
potential licensee firms, negotiates and monitors contracts, and protects the inventions assigned to it 
against infringements. Given the importance of the TTO, it is not surprising that the TTO is able to 
license more inventions in domains in which it has high level of capabilities, i.e. handled higher number 
of inventions. We found that the expertise of the TTO is positively and significantly related to the hazard 
of licensing an invention. As further steps, it would be interesting to consider the joint variation in the 
TTO capabilities and mutual knowledge of the inventors in future studies.  
This study also holds implications for managing technology transfer organizations, especially in a 
university setting. From initial interviews, we found that the TTO’s intellectual property managers and 
licensing managers realize how helpful and available specific inventors were in prior deals. The TTO 
managers use this information to assuage concerns from potential licensee firms regarding knowledge 
transfer and industry engagement issues -- the effects of prior licensing experience underscore the 
importance of this strategy. The added implication is that TTO managers should consider the mutual 
knowledge in teams and how comfortable the inventors are as a team, especially if they are from different 
scientific domains. The findings reveal that prior collaboration experience makes a substantive difference 
to inventions combining highly proximate and distant domains – highlighting that the “chemistry” 
between inventors and their ability to work together in commercialization is especially important.   
Limitations 
This study is not without its limitations. First, we rely on a single institution for data. There may 
be a risk of idiosyncratic institutional practices that influence our results. However, a single institution 
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naturally controls for between-institution differences that can confound results, especially with regard to 
coordination costs that arise due to differences in administrative bureaucracies. Furthermore, we follow 
the tradition of prior studies that have argued that with the advent of technology transfer associations and 
journals, the best practices are widely spread (Clarysse et al., 2005; Shane, 2000; Siegel et al., 2003; 
Nerkar & Shane, 2007). Another issue that stems from our setting is that the relationship between 
academic inventors and licensee firms is mediated by the university’s TTO, an organization dedicated to 
pursuing commercialization opportunities from an academic setting. Findings from this context may not 
be directly applicable to commercialization of R&D from corporate labs. However, the rise of contract 
research organizations and the increasing establishment of units dedicated to licensing technologies 
arising from corporate labs that the firm chooses not to commercialize itself may be appropriate avenues 
for generalizing the insights from this study.  
Second, we use a time invariant measure of science distance. We measure science distance at the 
end of our sample period in 2006. Since sciences are growing closer, we are more likely to be 
understating, rather than overstating science distance. If there is any bias, it is more likely to suggest that 
sciences are closer than they actually were at the time of the invention. Since our moderation hypotheses 
specify different effects at high science distance, this bias should work against us finding any results. 
Finally, scientists may elect to pursue projects taking into account their likelihood of commercialization, 
and plausibly, our study may suffer from an endogeneity problem. Theoretically, whereas endogeneity 
can confound the interpretation of main effects, it is hard to think of a compelling story that explains the 
moderator effects. It is possible that only inventors, who believe their coordination costs are low, engage 
in inventions combining distant sciences. If this were the case, then we should not find evidence for the 
moderation by prior collaboration experience. The fact that we still find significant results suggests that 
ours is a more conservative test for the impact of coordination costs on licensing.  
CONCLUSION 
This study adds to the literatures on coordination of experts from distant domains to 
commercialize new inventions. We capture disclosure and licensing data over a 26-year window that 
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starts with the uniform change in legislation (Bayh Dole Act) for all universities in the US. Our sample 
includes both patented and non-patented inventions, and our estimation is robust for single and multiple 
licensing events. We find support for our predictions that prior licensing and collaboration experience 
increases the hazard of licensing an invention. The pattern of our results suggests a nuanced mechanism 
of how prior collaboration within the team influences intra-team coordination costs and the hazard of 
licensing an invention. Specifically, we find that prior collaboration experience increases the hazard of 
licensing by a greater extent for inventions that combine very proximate or very distant sciences when 
compared to inventions that combine moderately distant sciences. In doing so, this study expands to the 
practice of commercialization of innovation, and the theories of coordination and organizational design.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of the Variables in the Study 
 
Variables Mean Sd. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Time (years) 8.0 5.4 1 
            2 Government funded 0.2 0.4 -.07 1 
           3 Private funded 0.6 0.5 -.08 -.51 1 
          4 Quality of invention 4.7 12.5 .04 .05 -.06 1 
         5 Stage of development 1.9 5.3 -.01 .03 .01 .48 1 
        6 Inventor academic prestige 6.7 1.7 -.15 -.05 .03 -.04 .00 1 
       7 Intellectual property not protected 0.7 0.5 -.06 .00 .00 -.58 -.56 -.04 1 
      8 Time from start 8.6 5.9 -.62 .09 .13 -.34 -.12 .03 .33 1 
     9 TTO capabilities 6.3 1.6 -.41 .02 .15 -.14 -.01 .33 .06 .45 1 
    10 Collaboration intensity 1.2 1.5 .16 -.01 -.15 .25 .09 .32 -.25 -.55 -.02 1 
   11 Science distance 0.3 0.4 .18 .04 -.12 .09 -.02 -.12 .01 -.18 -.24 -.07 1 
  12 Science distance squared 0.2 0.4 .17 .05 -.10 .08 -.02 -.17 .03 -.12 -.25 -.13 .96 1 
 13 Licensing experience 14.5 27.9 .05 -.02 -.08 .06 .05 .55 -.15 -.36 .11 .61 -.06 -.11 1 
14 Prior collaboration experience 0.6 0.4 .05 -.06 -.02 .15 .11 .28 -.18 -.22 .09 .51 -.12 -.13 .34 
N = 3776 disclosures 
 
 
47 
 
Table 2: Predicting survival odds of an Invention 
Dependent variable: Survival Odds (1) (2) (3) 
Government funded -0.214 -0.252 -0.227 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.167) 
Private funded -0.393*** -0.408*** -0.421*** 
 (0.144) (0.143) (0.142) 
Quality of invention -0.0333*** -0.0354*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Stage of development 0.0213** 0.0217** 0.0221** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Inventor academic prestige -0.0544 0.0420 0.0408 
 (0.038) (0.044) (0.044) 
Intellectual property not protected 0.505*** 0.471*** 0.499*** 
 (0.144) (0.143) (0.141) 
Time from start -0.000302*** -0.000318*** -0.000336*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TTO capabilities -0.261*** -0.214*** -0.216*** 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) 
Collaboration intensity -0.269*** -0.196*** -0.181*** 
 (0.043) (0.058) (0.057) 
THEORY VARIABLES    
Science distance  -1.542*** -1.404** 
  (0.551) (0.555) 
Science distance squared  1.858*** 1.788*** 
  (0.559) (0.560) 
Licensing experience  -0.00882*** -0.00907*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Prior collaboration experience  -0.0149 0.0501 
  (0.170) (0.168) 
Licensing* Science distance   -0.0809*** 
   (0.017) 
Licensing* Science distance squared   0.0950*** 
   (0.017) 
Collaboration * Science distance   4.329*** 
   (1.317) 
Collaboration * Science distance squared   -4.497*** 
   (1.336) 
Constant 8.866*** 5.960*** 6.063*** 
 (1.001) (0.854) (0.854) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-square 507.8 546.8 545.6 
Log likelihood -4374.3 -4336.0 -4297.1 
Observations 5010 5010 5010 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Note: Survival is an invention not licensed in the observation period. Hence negative and significant coefficients 
mean that the hazard of licensing increases with an increase in the explanatory variable
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Table 3: Robustness Sub Sample Estimation of Survival Odds of Inventions 
 
Dependent variable: Survival Odds Full Sample Not Patented Patented 
Government funded -0.227 -0.204 -0.259 
 (0.167) (0.291) (0.243) 
Private funded -0.421*** -0.845*** -0.0625 
 (0.142) (0.231) (0.202) 
Quality of invention -0.0364***  -0.0298*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
Stage of development 0.0221**  0.0179* 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Inventor academic prestige 0.0408 0.0328 0.0489 
 (0.044) (0.067) (0.063) 
Intellectual property not protected 0.499***   
 (0.141)   
Time from start -0.000336*** -0.000277** -0.000452*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TTO capabilities -0.216*** -0.216*** -0.254*** 
 (0.047) (0.066) (0.087) 
Collaboration intensity -0.181*** -0.230** -0.140* 
 (0.057) (0.093) (0.082) 
THEORY VARIABLES    
Science distance -1.404** -1.460* -2.218*** 
 (0.555) (0.900) (0.773) 
Science distance squared 1.788*** 2.390*** 1.835** 
 (0.560) (0.926) (0.786) 
Licensing experience -0.00907*** -0.0148*** -0.0064* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.0038) 
Prior Collaboration experience 0.0501 0.0838 0.241 
 (0.168) (0.257) (0.214) 
Licensing* Science distance -0.0809*** -0.118*** -0.0307 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) 
Licensing* Science distance squared 0.0950*** 0.140*** 0.0304 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.028) 
Collaboration * Science distance 4.329*** 5.879*** 3.667* 
 (1.317) (2.005) (2.000) 
Collaboration* Science distance squared -4.497*** -5.433*** -4.317** 
 (1.336) (2.046) (1.995) 
Constant 6.063*** 3.814*** 6.587*** 
 (0.854) (0.761) (0.772) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Chi square 545.6 476.4 237.9 
Log likelihood -4297.1 -2734.2 -1430.2 
Observations 5010 3510 1500 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Figure 1: Hazard of licensing at different levels of science distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Science distance and hazard of licensing moderated by licensing experience 
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Figure 3: Science distance and hazard of licensing moderated by collaboration experience  
 
 
 
 
Reddi Kotha is an assistant professor in the Strategy and Organization Group at the Lee Kong Chian 
School of Business, Singapore Management University.  Reddi received his PhD in entrepreneurship 
from London Business School. He studies organizational structures and processes used by entrepreneurs 
and firms to bring new products and services to market. 
 
Gerry George is the deputy principal for faculty and programs and professor of innovation and 
entrepreneurship at Imperial College London.  Gerry also serves as the director of the Rajiv Gandhi 
Centre at Imperial College London. He received his PhD from Virginia Commonwealth University.  His 
recent work examines strategic and organizational factors such as business models and organizational 
design and their impact on innovation and performance in technology ventures and emerging markets.   
 
Kannan Srikanth is an assistant professor of strategy in the Indian School of Business. He received his 
PhD from the London Business School. His research focuses on learning and coordination aspects of 
organizational adaptation and innovation.  
 
   
 
 
  
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Science Distance
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
Licensing Odds
Low Collaboration
Mean Collaboration
High Collaboration
